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Societal security and social psychology
T O B I A S  T H E I L E R *
Abstract. The concept of societal security as developed by the Copenhagen school has three
underlying weaknesses: a tendency to reify societies as independent social agents, a use of too
vague a definition of ‘identity’, and a failure to demonstrate sufficiently that social security
matters to individuals. This article shows that applying social identity theory to the societal
security concept helps remedy these weaknesses and closes the theoretical gaps that the
Copenhagen school has left open. It enables us to treat ‘society’ as an independent variable
without reifying it as an independent agent. It also suggests a much sharper definition of
identity, and a rationale for the Copenhagen school’s claim that individuals have a
psychological need to achieve societal security by protecting their group boundaries. Social
identity theory thus supports the societal security concept in its central assumptions while
giving it stronger theoretical foundations and greater analytical clout.
Introduction
The concept of societal security first came to prominence in Barry Buzan’s classic
People, States and Fear.1 From the early 1990s, a series of writings by Buzan, Ole
Wæver and a number of collaborators revived and significantly reinterpreted it,
turning societal security into a conceptual cornerstone of what some have labelled
the ‘Copenhagen school’ in International Relations (IR).2 By the end of the decade,
the Copenhagen school had developed additional concepts and societal security had
lost some of its erstwhile centrality. Nonetheless, it has remained the most innovative
element in the Copenhagen school and the one that sets it apart most clearly from
other approaches in International Relations.
It thus comes as no surprise that many critics of the Copenhagen school make
societal security their main target. They accuse it of being too fuzzy and ‘soft’ a
concept to be either theoretically convincing or analytically useful. And they argue
that its concern with issues such as identity, culture, ethnicity and nationalism
signifies more a desire by members of the Copenhagen school to jump on trendy
academic bandwagons than the basis for a credible challenge to classical security
studies.3
This article focuses on the concept of societal security and on the criticisms it has
attracted. It contends that many of these criticisms thrive on theoretical ambiguities
and gaps which overshadow the societal security concept and which the Copenhagen
school has not adequately addressed. But it shows that applying social psychological
theory to the societal security logic helps resolve these ambiguities and close the
gaps. As a result, the concept of societal security acquires stronger theoretical
foundations and lives up better to its analytical potential.
Social psychology stands far apart from most other areas of the humanities and
social sciences in terms of methodology, terminology and level of analysis. This
helps explain why very few students of IR have systematically engaged with it, even
those who are otherwise receptive to ‘human nature’ explanations. The Copenhagen
school is no exception. Yet as this article shows, many assumptions that underlie the
societal security concept have a strong bearing on social psychology, and the two
ultimately make very similar claims. Social psychology, however, corroborates these
claims in a much more coherent and rigorous fashion than does the Copenhagen
school. Incorporating the insights of the former into the latter thus makes the
notion of societal security more precise. Beyond this, it shows how IR can learn
from a body of knowledge which it has too often overlooked.
Societal security
A good way to illustrate the concept of societal security is by contrasting it with
more traditional approaches to security in IR. The latter are primarily concerned
with the security of the state. Since the state is a legal and political construct built on
the concept of sovereignty over a defined territory and population, it achieves
security by ensuring its continued sovereignty and territorial integrity. And since
traditionally the main threat to these has come from military aggression by other
states, conventional approaches to security are preoccupied with broadly defined
military issues, such as deterrence, balances of power and alliance formation.
This conventional security agenda leaves little room for a systematic treatment of
society, defined as a social, cultural and psychological formation distinct from the
political and legal construct that is the state. Instead, implicitly drawing on an ideal-
typical notion of the nation-state as a unit in which the political, social and cultural
converge, it conceives of society as the social and cultural ‘substance’ that the hard
political and military shell of the state encloses: each society has ‘its’ state and each
state ‘its’ society. Societal security – defined as the cultural, linguistic and identitive
survival of a particular social group – then becomes the logical extension of state
security.
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In Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe and a series of
subsequent writings, Buzan, Wæver and their collaborators refuse to subsume
societal security under the heading of state security. Instead, they treat society both
as an object of security in its own right and as a potential security actor.
What, for the Copenhagen school, is ‘society’ and what is ‘societal security’?
Society is defined as the social unit that provides the primary locus of identification
for its members. It has both an ‘objective’ and a ‘subjective’ dimension: objectively, a
society is signified and differentiated from other societies by markers such as
language and customs; subjectively, it is the repository of shared meanings and
identifications for its members who possess what Karl Deutsch has termed a shared
‘we-feeling’.4
According to the Copenhagen school, the most important identity communities
in modern times are ethnic groups and nations. But at different historical stages they
have included various other kinds of social formations, ranging from religious
groups to clans and tribes. What characterises every identity community is that its
members afford it a claim to survival which is ultimately self-referential. Since it is
bound up with their identity, they value the community’s preservation as an end in
itself rather than just as a means to achieve other ends, and hence give it priority
over other potential objectives. For the Copenhagen school, it is this quality that
turns identity communities into security objects.
Societal security, then, pertains to the perceived ability of an identity com-
munity to survive. It refers to ‘the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for
evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious
and national identity and custom’ in a given society.5 This implies that societal
security, too, has an ‘objective’ and a ‘subjective’ dimension. In the former sense, it
is linked to the preservation of group markers such as language and customs;
subjectively, it entails the community’s survival as a locus of identification for its
members.
Though they hesitate to do so explicitly, most Copenhagen scholars would
probably accept that some security threats are not mere discursive constructs but
instead have an underlying ‘realness’ to them – the Nazi threat to Jews, for
example, or Iraq’s threat to Kuwait. All the same, for the Copenhagen school
societal security and perceived threats to it typically have a strong discursive
dimension. The crucial variable is securisation. Securisation represents a speech act
with a ‘specific rhetorical structure’.6 To securitise is to identify an alleged threat
to the survival of the community and to the shared identity it sustains, its
presumed origins and perpetrators, as well as a strategy to ward off that threat and
thereby render society secure again. Given that these are perceived to be existential
threats to something whose survival is sought as an end in itself and is afforded
absolute priority, effective securisation often leads to defensive measures that go
beyond the limits of what qualifies as politically or morally acceptable conduct in
normal circumstances. Perceived threats to societal security generate a sense of
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emergency and a corresponding willingness to take extraordinary emergency
measures.7
For the Copenhagen school, a society that seeks to fend off a perceived identity
threat becomes a security actor. What kind of defensive measures it takes depends
on the nature of the presumed threat: they can range from restrictions on
immigrants or foreign films to the launching of a pre-emptive war to defend the
society’s ‘way of life’ against foreigners. But as was argued, in this rendering societies
will take such defensive measures only if the ‘objective’ developments they are
intended to ward off have been securitised to the point where they are perceived to
pose an identity threat. For only then is societal security seen to be in danger.
How does societal security relate to state security? For as long as state and society
– or nation – are fused, the two typically converge. Threats to state boundaries are at
once threats to societal boundaries and thus constitute potential identity threats.
The two also converge in the sense that societies facing perceived identity threats will
call on ‘their’ states to act on their behalf – by initiating immigration controls,
cultural content quotas, pre-emptive wars or whatever.
Yet what interests the Copenhagen school above all are cases where state and
society are not congruent. They focus on two particular situations.
First, many states are internally divided into several societal units – be they self-
conceived nations, ethnic communities or cultural or linguistic sub-groups. In these
cases, societal security and state security may well be negatively correlated, as one
may seek to enhance its own security at the other’s expense. State governments often
seek to ensure the allegiance of minority groups by trying to culturally assimilate
them into the dominant culture. Conversely, many minority groups have sought to
secure their cultural and identitive survival by demanding a state of their own.
According to the Copenhagen school, the longing by insecure societies to obtain
their own states contributed to, among other things, the disintegration of Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union in the 1990s.
The second example is the European Union (EU). There, according to Copenhagen
scholars, we witness a gradual transfer of some political functions traditionally
exercised by the state to the supranational level. But so far this has not triggered the
parallel formation of a ‘European nation’ to match. As a result, Europe’s primary
societal units – its nations – persevere, but are increasingly unable to rely on their
respective states for security. Seen against this backdrop, the EU faces a range of
different possible scenarios.
First, European integration may progress relatively smoothly and without
threatening the societal security of its constituent populations. This is most likely to
happen if the EU convinces its member populations that it will not culturally
assimilate them and if it leaves some essential ‘protective functions’ at the state level,
for instance in cultural policy and education. In the second scenario, European
integration does elicit a security response from its member populations, but this does
not translate into hostility against the EU. Instead, it leads to a growing ‘culturis-
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ation’ of the different member nations: they seek to strengthen, reaffirm and
‘rediscover’ their social and cultural distinctiveness to ensure their survival in a
Europe of weakening political and economic boundaries. In the third scenario, fears
for societal security lead to backlashes against the EU itself, possibly even to a
reversal of European integration. For societal security theorists, the widespread
popular opposition to the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s was an example of
such a development: once the EU’s member populations started to fear that further
integration would threaten their national identities, they sought to ‘call back’ their
states for protection.8
According to Copenhagen scholars we cannot yet predict which of these
scenarios will ultimately prevail in the EU. What is more, all three could become
redundant if the EU manages to evolve into a security object in its own right, either
complementing or even usurping the security dignity currently enjoyed by its
constituent units. This is theoretically possible but far from inevitable. But whatever
the end-result, for the Copenhagen school it is the EU’s impact on the societal
security of its member populations that will help determine its ultimate fate, not just
the interests of state élites and EU bureaucrats, economic conditions, ‘functional




The most serious charge against the societal security concept is that of reification.
Bill McSweeney, for instance, claims that for the Copenhagen school both ‘ ‘‘society’’
and ‘‘identity’’ are [. . .] projected as objective realities, out there to be discovered
and analyzed’9 while it fails to approach communities ‘from a deconstructionist
sociological angle, which focuses on the processes and practices by which people and
groups construct their self-image’.10 According to this line of criticism, societal
security theorists reify communities by treating them as timeless entities in search of
security and protection rather than as culturally and historically contingent products
of the social world. By extension, they treat them as fixed rather than as being
subject to perpetual redefinition and reimagination.
Yet before the societal security concept can be tried on the reification charge, the
concept of reification itself needs some clarification. In particular, we need to
distinguish between two types of reification.
The first type equates to what in the research on nationalism and ethnicity is
known as primordialism or essentialism. This is based on the notion that nations,
ethnic groups and the like represent ahistorical entities whose origins are not social –
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rather like rivers, mountains and animal species. Such a conception thus naturalises
human communities; it obfuscates their socially constructed and historically con-
tingent character.
Buzan, Wæver and their collaborators, however, explicitly reject primordialism
and throughout their writings emphasise the socially constructed origins of nations
and other identity communities. What they do imply is that once a community has
become socially constructed it can become so stable and psychologically entrenched
that it acquires a widely accepted self-referential claim to survival and thereby
becomes a potential security object.
With this in mind, some critics might accuse the Copenhagen school of treating
societies as de facto fixed variables rather than as entities that are constantly
reconstructed, reimagined, renegotiated and so on, and of failing to endogenise
these social (re)construction processes into its account of societal security dynamics.
Yet this line of criticism is not compelling. As was argued, Buzan Wæver et al. readily
admit to treating social construction processes as exogenous to the societal security
logic and societies as potentially stable, but they manage to mount a persuasive
defence. In particular, they correctly argue that social constructivism does not imply
that the social world is always fickle. Once constructed, many social practices, beliefs
and institutions become deeply sedimented and thereby congeal and change only
very slowly.11 In the very long term, of course, the assumption of stability is unlikely
to hold, but then the insight that in the very long run all aspects of social reality
always change beyond recognition is often no more useful to the social analyst than
the notion that in the long term we are all dead. The central point to bear in mind is
that the Copenhagen school uses societal security as a conceptual tool to try to
account for specific events that have occurred at specific points in time in specific
contexts – events which range from Denmark’s initial rejection of the Maastricht
Treaty to the war in Bosnia and the rise of anti-immigrant movements in parts of
western Europe. In line with this, it stands on solid methodological ground when it
treats the social constructs concerned as de facto stable and fixed over the limited
periods relevant to the analysis of these events, as long as there is no evidence to the
contrary. This point is further illustrated, and to some extent qualified, below.
If the charge of reification in the sense of primordialism or unduly ignoring the
fluidity of social reality thus does not seriously undermine the societal security
concept, allegations that it suffers from a second type of reification are much more
difficult to refute. This type of reification is compatible with the claim that human
groups and institutions – be they states, nations, societies, armies, political science
departments or whatever – are socially constructed rather than somehow ‘essential’
or primordial. But it is reifying because it treats these groups and institutions as
independent actors with preferences and the ability to shape social outcomes. As
Rogers Brubaker has argued, in contemporary nationalism research this type of
reification often leads to a ‘substantialist’ approach to nations and ethnic groups. It
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treats them as ‘categories of analysis’ rather than as mere ‘categories of practice’ and
as social agents with needs and aspirations and the capacity to act in a purposive
manner.12
Buzan, Wæver and other members of the Copenhagen school, too, subscribe to
such a conception. This leads them to describe society as a ‘social agent which has
an independent reality and which is different and more than the sum of its parts’.13
And it allows them to talk about societies as actors that are able to form preferences
regarding this or that issue, of communities looking to defend their culture, and of
nations striving for security.
At the same time, Buzan, Wæver and their colleagues admit that their treatment
of societies as ‘units of analysis’ and independent social agents goes ‘against
sociological orthodoxy’14 and they anticipate the charges of reification it is bound to
attract. They insist, however, that this view is ‘essential’15 to their model. In places,
they suggest that this is so because the very concept of societal security presupposes
the existence of societies as real entities. At other times, they associate their ‘societies
as social agents’ approach with a stated preference for methodological collectivism
over methodological individualism, and with the alleged necessity of treating
‘society as more than the sum of its parts’16 so as to avoid sliding into an ‘atomistic,
aggregate view of security’.17
Yet, paradoxically, in some places Copenhagen scholars themselves seek to break
with such reifying notions of society. Take the concept of ‘securisation’. It is in
essence an attempt to deconstruct the intersubjective processes that ultimately lead
to ‘society’ perceiving and doing certain things in certain ways. At times, Buzan and
Wæver travel even further down the de-reification route, suggesting that society
should not be treated as a ‘thing’ at all but rather as a mental representation and
discursive referent object. This is the case, for instance, when they insist that
‘ ‘‘[s]ociety’’ never speaks, it is only there to be spoken for’.18 When arguing in this
mode, they come close to a conception of groups that predominates in social
psychology, as is discussed further below.
In sum, the Copenhagen school fluctuates between reifying conceptions and de-
reifying ambitions, between treating societies as ‘categories of analysis’ and inde-
pendent social agents on the one hand, and treating them as products of the human
imagination and mere discursive referent objects on the other.19 Many approaches in
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the social sciences experience this tension, and it is very difficult to avoid. Using
language to think and talk about social groups, institutions and practices inevitably
entails a need to ‘pin them down’ and thereby a measure of objectification and
reification.20 The many ‘scare quotes’ in the contemporary social science literature
epitomise the resulting quest to signal distance and reflexivity.
All this is bound up with many important metatheoretical questions and it is hard
to fault Copenhagen scholars for not addressing them at greater length. All the
same, for the societal security logic to be potentially plausible it must conceptualise
society as something other than a social agent. The most important reason is this: it
is only by shedding the idea that societies strive for societal security and defend their
identity that we can focus fully on individuals as security-seeking and identifying
agents. And as is shown below, this in turn is the prerequisite to successfully tackling
the question of motivation and therefore of what drives the societal security
dynamic in the first place. But before this, the next section turns to the second
problem that plagues the societal security concept, which is its failure to espouse a
sharp enough notion of identity.
Identity
As was noted, it is identity rather than society or security that ultimately constitutes
the key variable in the societal security literature: people want societal security
because society helps sustain their identity. This preoccupation with identity must
lead one to ask how well the Copenhagen school defines identity, and whether this
definition has solid theoretical grounding.
When the Copenhagen school came into being in the early 1990s, ‘identity’ had
already experienced a surge in popularity throughout the social sciences and
humanities. But some had also started to voice doubts regarding its usefulness.21
They assert that throughout the social science literature ‘identity’ is overused and
poorly defined and that this contributes to reifying and ‘substantialist’ approaches to
social formations (for example, ‘the Danish identity’ or, worse still, ‘Denmark’s
identity’). Moreover, critics accuse much of this literature of depicting identity as a
‘thing’ that people ‘possess’ rather than as a concept that signifies a process of
permanent location and relocation of the self in relation to the identity object. In
this way, identity, too, is often reified.
The Copenhagen school’s use of identity is vulnerable to many of these criticisms.
To be sure, in places Buzan and Wæver claim to treat identity as an ‘intersubjectively
constituted social factor’,22 and Wæver in particular sometimes alludes to a
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Derridian notion of identity as epitomising a kind of infinite longing and search for
closure.23 But ultimately, he and his colleagues revert to a more prosaic concept of
identity, as something rather fixed that people possess and want to defend. What is
more, combined with their conception of society as a social agent discussed earlier,
they often slide into a double reification scenario in which societies possess identities
which they seek to protect.24
Here too, the danger of reification owes much to the dilemma that the very
enunciation of a concept such as ‘identity’ (much like ‘society’ and ‘nation’) to some
extent fixes, congeals and ‘thingifies’ its referent. But Copenhagen school theorists
compound this problem. For, like much of the identity-centred literature in
comparative politics and IR, they rely on an unelaborated notion of identity that is
oblivious to the large body of psychological and social psychological scholarship in
which the identity concept originated. As is shown below, it is precisely by engaging
with this literature that one can obtain a sharper and more reflective definition of
identity that treats it as something other than a possession. The same engagement
also leads to the at first puzzling conclusion that people derive their communal
identities more from the community’s boundaries than from its cultural ‘content’.
Motivation
The third problem with the societal security concept as proposed by the Copenhagen
school is its failure to account for what drives the alleged societal security logic. As
was noted, in places it makes the reifying claim that societies seek to protect their
societal security. Elsewhere it implies that it is ultimately individuals who do so, but
then fails adequately to explain what motivates them. The question that Copenhagen
scholars largely fail to address is thus the following: why do people strive for societal
security and why do they want to preserve their group identity?
This question is crucial. After all, from anti-Maastricht and anti-immigrant
movements in western Europe to the various east European state breakups, even
events that are the empirical jewels in the crown of the societal security theorists
have attracted competing explanations. Many of them focus on economic rather
then identity-centred motivations, and consider elite calculations rather than mass
sentiments to be the deciding factor.25 These alternative accounts may well suffer
from a myriad of shortcomings in their own right. But without theoretical evidence
for the assertion that in some circumstances individuals value societal security more
than other objectives, they enjoy no less prima facie plausibility than do societal
security-centred explanations. In short, proponents of the societal security concept
must justify their claim that societal security matters to individuals.
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Such justifications must be of a social psychological nature in the broadest sense
of the term. That is, they must centre on the relationship between individuals and
society, and on the dialectic between psychological processes on the one hand and
social processes on the other – in much the same way that the societal security logic
itself implies some kind of interchange between these two levels. Moreover, given its
core subject manner, social psychology has the potential to advance the other two
issues raised in this section: the need for a non-reified concept of society and for a
sharper definition of identity.
So far, the Copenhagen school has failed to engage with social psychology, as
have almost all other approaches in IR. It is against this backdrop that the next
section peers over the disciplinary fence in order to glean from contemporary social
psychology what is most relevant to the societal security concept. It concentrates on
one approach that over the past twenty years has become dominant in the social
psychological study of group behaviour, called social identity theory.26 After
outlining its main features, the essay goes on to apply social identity theory to the
societal security concept and shows how it helps resolve the problems just discussed.
Social identity theory
Social psychology is a broad field. This is true for both the subject matter it espouses
and for the range of approaches that have flourished within it. Yet as for the
particular sub-field of social psychology that is concerned with group behaviour, the
past twenty years have seen a growing concentration on one approach called social
identity theory (SIT). Social identity theory originated with the pioneering work of
Henry Tajfel, John Turner and their collaborators in the 1970s. Since then, its core
assumptions have achieved a widespread following in the mainstream literature on
group psychology. This section briefly summarises these, starting with a legendary
psychological experiment that led to their formulation.27
The minimal group experiment
The minimal group experiment involves a number of volunteers who have not
previously met.28 The experimenter starts out by asking them to estimate the number
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of dots shown on a slide and to write down their estimate. Immediately afterwards the
subjects are led into individual cubicles. There they learn that they have been assigned
into one of two groups (the ‘A group’ or the ‘B group’) depending on whether they
under- or overestimated the number of dots on the slide. In reality, the separation is
completely random. Having been assigned to a group and without meeting their fellow
group members, the subjects receive the task of distributing money in the form of
points between members of their own group and members of the other group (but
never to themselves). To do so they must select from a range of pre-defined
distribution matrices. Some matrices allocate the money equally between members of
both groups while others allocate much more to one group than to the other.
In these circumstances the commonsense expectation is that the subjects will be
indifferent as to how they distribute the money. After all, their group categorisation is
based on a single trivial criterion and completely random and ad hoc, and they are
equally unfamiliar with in- and outgroup members. However, their actual behaviour
turns out to be very different. First, they display consistent ingroup favouritism: they
give more money to members of their own group than to those in the other group.
Second, they are prepared to see their own group worse off in absolute terms if this
improves its relative position vis-à-vis the other group: beating the outgroup by a wide
margin is more important than maximising ingroup profit. In short, the arbitrary, ad
hoc and minimal nature of the groups in the experiment does not prevent the
participants from internalising their group categorisation and from discriminating
against the outgroup in favour of the ingroup. Even though the groups in the
experiment are objectively minimal they become subjectively meaningful.
A cascade of subsequent experiments refined the basic minimal group setting and
produced similar findings. For instance, they show that group discrimination occurs
even when the experimenter makes it clear to the subjects that the group division is
completely arbitrary (‘ultraminimal’), for example, by throwing a coin in order to
determine their group placement.29 Moreover, similar results obtained in a series of
cross-cultural experiments that involved participants from a wide range of social,
cultural, geographic and religious backgrounds. This, in turn, suggests that they
reflect innate human dispositions rather than cultural conditioning.30
How should one explain such findings and the underlying propensity for
‘groupness’ they suggest? Social identity theory focuses on two main factors: our
tendency to divide the world into categories and our quest to maximise self-esteem.
These are now discussed in turn.
Categorisation
Humans inhabit a world in which there are few clear lines of division. Social and
physical reality is fluid and continuous rather than neatly divided into different
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categories. But this threatens to overwhelm our cognitive apparatus with a mass of
seemingly chaotic and unstructured stimuli. To counteract this, we seek to order,
systematise and simplify our field of perception by dividing the social and physical
world into categories. This makes it more manageable and renders our ‘experience of
the world subjectively meaningful’.31 For instance, when we look at a rainbow we
detect relatively discrete bands of colour, even though its colours are in reality
continuous. In the same way, we perceive the world to contain races, generations,
personality types, historical epochs and so forth, all of which reflect attempts to
impose structure upon confusion and order upon chaos. Categorisation, then, ‘is a
fundamental and universal process precisely because it satisfies a basic human need
for cognitive parsimony.32
Categorisation always entails accentuation. We perceive items placed into the
same category as more similar to one another than they are in reality but more
different from those in other categories than is objectively the case. As a result, the
cognitive divisions we impose on the world do not seem arbitrary to us but instead a
reflection of seemingly objective breaks and discontinuities.
Social identity theory builds on these premises. It asserts that human beings, too,
are subject to being categorised and that this leads to the formation of groups. This
has two main corollaries.
First, just as we internalise other divisions of the world we internalise our group
categorisations, too. Through this process the group ‘installs itself in the mind of the
individual’33 and becomes a part of his or her self-concept. As the individual
becomes part of the group, so the group becomes part of the individual; the self and
the group partially merge.
Second, in line with the principle of accentuation discussed earlier, we tend to see
those who are placed in the same category – including ourselves – as more similar to
each other than is actually the case while we overestimate the differences that
separate us from members of other groups. In other words, we conceive of others
and ourselves partially, in a ‘depersonalised’ manner, as ‘undifferentiated items in a
unified social category’.34 For social identity theory, such ‘depersonalisation’ is at the
heart of phenomena such as group stereotyping and prejudice which are discussed
below. But first, I turn to the second major factor which, according to social identity
theory, conditions group behaviour.
Social comparison
In common with almost all other psychological theories, social identity theory
asserts that individuals have a need to maintain a positive self-image, as this is linked
to their sense of self-worth and their self-esteem. One’s self-image, in turn, is always
formed in part through social comparison. For instance, to maintain my perception
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of myself as a virile and brave individual I must implicitly or explicitly compare
myself to people who I believe do not qualify for these characteristics. All self-
perceptions depend in part on how we perceive others.
Social identity theory draws on the concept of social comparison and argues that
it, too, has a group dimension. This is implicit in the logic of group categorisation
and internalisation discussed above. By internalising a group category it becomes
part of our self-concept. As a result, a favourable image of the group reflects
favourably upon the self. Moreover, like self-perceptions, group perceptions are
always relational; they are created and sustained through comparison with out-
groups. Consequently, according to social identity theory people distinguish their
ingroups from outgroups in ways that they perceive favourably to reflect upon the
ingroup (and thus upon themselves) and, by extension, negatively upon the
outgroup. And since the quest for a positive self-image is ongoing, they continuously
compare their ingroups to outgroups along dimensions that make their groups look
good to them.35
Group behaviour
For social identity theory, the two basic mechanisms of categorisation and social
comparison thus account for group formation and group perception. But in addition,
they also account for group behaviour – or, differently put, for the behaviour of
individuals when acting in ‘group mode’.
First, group members seek to align their actions and beliefs with what they
perceive to be dominant group norms, with what social identity theory calls the
‘group prototype’. For example, if the characteristics ascribed to the group include
the attributes ‘virile and brave’, its members will seek to adjust their actions so as to
appear to others and to themselves as ‘virile and brave’. This tendency for
behavioural conformity logically grows out of the categorisation, accentuation and
internalisation principles discussed earlier. Individuals seek to level ingroup differ-
ences by conforming to the ‘group prototype’ and they apply this not only to how
they perceive other ingroup members but also to how they perceive and, crucially,
act themselves. As a result, people gravitate towards conformity with group norms
even in the absence of hierarchies or institutions that seek to make them conform.36
Second, social identity theory suggests that we can enhance our valuation of the
ingroup and thus of the self not only by perceiving outgroups in a discriminatory
fashion but also by treating them in this way, just as the subjects in the minimal
group experiment improve their self-esteem by giving more to the ingroup than to
the outgroup. In real world situations, of course, such discriminatory behaviour
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often leads to intergroup conflict. Yet, according to social identity theory, even
conflict itself can improve individuals’ self-esteem in so far as it offers an opportunity
to try and heighten the perceived superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup. For
this reason, conflicts between groups are always about more than just the ostensible
object of the dispute (such as territory or resources). Instead, they are in part about
winning per se, to the point where winning can become an end in itself and where the
defeat of one’s group is often linked to a sense of personal humiliation.
Finally, social identity theory asserts that once we have internalised a group
category and thereby acquired the relevant social identity, we generally want to
preserve it. We want to do so because of the cognitive importance of categorisation
and because the group is now part of us and bound up with our sense of self-worth.
Consequently, perceived threats to the group – such as to its relative status or to its
very existence – are also threats to the self, and for the individuals concerned
protecting the former means protecting the latter as well.
In sum, social identity theory rests on two pillars: categorisation and social
comparison. These
operate together [. . .] to generate a specific form of behaviour: group behaviour. This involves
intergroup differentiation and discrimination, ingroup favouritism, perceptions of the
evaluative superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup, stereotypic perception of ingroup,
outgroup and self, conformity to group norms, affective preference for ingroup over
outgroup, and so on. Categorization leads to stereotypic [. . .] perceptions of self, ingroup and
outgroup, and also a degree of accentuation of intergroup differences. Social comparison
accounts for the selectivity of the accentuation effect [. . .] and the magnitude of the
exaggeration of intergroup differences and intragroup similarities.37
For social identity theory, these elementary processes of categorisation and social
comparison can enter into every group situation, ranging from nuclear arms races
and relations between different communities in multicultural societies to clashes
between rivalling football supporters or feuding family clans at a wedding. At the
same time, social identity theory is self-consciously abstract. It makes no assumptions
regarding the nature of groups, the signifiers used to demarcate group boundaries or
the group norms that prevail at any given time. All these factors are socially con-
structed and therefore culturally specific and historically contingent. Accounting for
them is the responsibility of historians, sociologists, anthropologists and political
scientists. Their inquiries must focus on the role of social, economic and political
power and interest in defining particular categorisation agendas and group norms, on
the formation of intra-group hierarchies and so forth. The task of social psychology,
by contrast, is to identify the underlying psychological parameters within which the
social construction of groups and the processes within and between them transpire.
To be sure, as many social theorists from Durkheim onwards have argued, attempts
even indirectly to relate ‘human nature’ variables to particular social phenomena
are fraught with dangers, not least that of pyschological reductionism.38 These
difficulties, however, cannot further concern us here. Instead, the next section returns
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to the Copenhagen school and its notion of societal security. It tries to show that
social identity theory helps resolve the three major difficulties that are linked to the
societal security concept as they were discussed earlier.
Societal security and social identity
As was argued, the first weakness of the societal security concept as proposed by the
Copenhagen school is its tendency to reify societies – not by essentialising or
‘primordialising’ them, but by treating them as social actors with preferences and the
potential for agency. At the same time, non-reified conceptions of social groups and
institutions are hard to come by. The search for them can lead one dangerously close
to the slippery slope of theorising the social world out of existence and of sliding
into the kind of reductionistic individualism which the Copenhagen school is right
to reject.
Social identity theory suggests a way out of this dilemma. It saves us from having
to choose between adopting reifying notions of groups as purposive social agents or,
alternatively, rejecting society as an analytical variable altogether and thereby ipso
facto repudiating the societal security concept in the process. Groups, according to
social identity theory, are internalised categories that give rise to representations of
‘groupness’ and to corresponding identifications, preferences and behaviour. These
group representations are psychological facts that shape individuals’ beliefs and
actions, but they are not social actors themselves. Recall the minimal group
experiment. The groups invented by the experimenter and internalised by the
subjects are in the first instance mental representations. But qua mental represent-
ations they exist and account for the behaviour of the subjects in the experiment. In
much the same way, nations, ethnic groups and other communities exist in the first
instance inside the individuals who identify with them, as representations of
‘groupness’, ‘nationness’ and so forth.
All this, to be sure, does not relegate groups to the status of mental hallucin-
ations. Instead, to remain psychological facts in the first place groups must manifest
themselves ‘out there’ in individuals’ everyday social experience. Consider the
countless practices and artefacts, the many ways of thinking, acting, talking,
relating, knowing, producing and feeling that are shaped by one’s belonging to a
particular group. Together, these inscribe the group in social and physical space; they
sustain its perceived ‘entitivity’ and make it subjectively apprehended as real.
Seen against this background, the reproduction of identity communities –
nations, ethnic groups and the like – ultimately hinges on an ongoing ‘dialectic of
the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality’.39 The
community’s members continuously ‘act out’ – or externalise – their internalised
representations of the group by thinking, acting and feeling in line with prevailing
group norms and the ‘group prototype’. As individuals externalise their represent-
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ations of the community in this way and experience other individuals doing the
same, the community becomes intersubjectively real. It appears as an object ‘out
there’ in social space, liable to be observed and experienced.40 To use the earlier
terminology, it becomes a ‘category of practice’. But as soon as individuals
experience the group as objective reality they internalise it anew, with the resulting
internalisations bound to be externalised again, and so forth. In reality, this dialectic
of internalisation and externalisation is of course concurrent rather than sequential.
People internalise and externalise simultaneously and continuously as part of a cycle
of group reproduction that must continue for as long as the group exists.41
The logic of societal security as postulated by the Copenhagen school must be
understood in light of this dialectic. Individuals seek to defend their group boundaries
because, as social identity theory postulates, group belonging satisfies basic cognitive
and emotional needs. Sparked by securisation processes discussed earlier, this can lead
to attempts to ward off a perceived threat to the group by, say, building a fence to keep
out immigrants or fighting a war to defend the group’s ‘way of life’. But the very act of
defending the group (through fences, wars or whatever) is itself a group-signifying and
group-affirming one. By engaging in it, people externalise and affirm the existence of
the group and their membership in it to each other and to themselves. Intersubjectively
they come to experience the group more intensely and as more real. In the language of
social identity theory, the group becomes more strongly internalised and more salient,
and occupies a still larger part of the self. As a result, it becomes still more apt to elicit
societal security responses, which in turn makes it still more salient and so on. In this
way, the group as social representation that – mediated by securisation – conditions
conflictual behaviour on the one hand, and intergroup conflict as a social process
marked by this behaviour on the other, can become mutually constitutive.42
In some circumstances, this cycle of group identification, group salience and
group defence can accelerate to the point where it spirals out of the control of all
social actors concerned. Once it has gathered enough momentum it has the potential
to ‘overcome’ them and to contribute to the intensity and ferocity that characterises
some group conflicts yet is often incomprehensible to those who are not caught in
that cycle themselves. The many eyewitness descriptions of violence in places such as
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in terms of ‘suddenness’, ‘delirium’ and ‘ethnic
intoxication’ are, I think, an attempt to capture the effects of this dynamic on the
participants.43 On a more analytical level, a similar notion shines through in (still
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rare) attempts to conceive of such phenomena through the prism of a ‘sociology of
the event’. It takes seriously the notions of ‘critical moments’, sudden fluctuations,
ruptures and ‘overcome-ness’ as factors that impact on the course of group
conflict.44
For the societal security approach, one important theoretical insight that flows
from this is that the intensity of a given inter-group conflict does not just depend on
factors such as the strength of initial securisation moves and the discursive power of
the ‘securitisers’. Instead, once the dialectic between group defence and group
affirmation has taken hold, it can acquire a dynamic of its own and escape the
control of the ‘securitisers’ who initially unleashed it. This in turn adds an important
dynamic and transformative dimension to the societal security logic which the
Copenhagen school largely lacks. Related to this, understanding securisation, group
defence, group salience and group identification in dialectical terms enables one to
endogenise the construction and transformation of groups into the logic of societal
security processes – something, that, as was shown, the Copenhagen school itself
also does not do. More specifically, it qualifies the insistence by the Copenhagen
school that when analysing societal security processes we should treat communities
as de facto fixed entities. As was argued, given the high degree of rigidity and
‘sedimentation’ of many groups such an approach is often justified. But in some
circumstances, the logic of group conflict, group defence and group salience may
transform communities so rapidly and so significantly that this transformation
should be endogenised into accounts of group identity and group conflict. For
example, for many Bosnians the very notion of ‘Bosnia’ and ‘what it means to be
Bosnian’ might have changed dramatically during the relatively brief period of
recent conflict, with these changes feeding back into the course of the conflict itself,
and then again into representations of ‘Bosnia’ and ‘Bosnian-ness’ and so forth.45
Finally, the same conception allows us to treat groups as both dependent and
independent variables. They are dependent variables because, as is all social reality,
they are ultimately human-made. They typically reflect both the particular social,
economic and political interests of the initial categorisers but also, following social
identity theory, a basic human need for ‘groupness’. At the same time, groups are
also independent variables, in two particular ways. First, as does all ‘sedimented’
social reality, they confront most individuals as something ‘external’ to them and
mould their beliefs and behaviour. Second, through the dialectical process discussed
above, groups can become literally independent: they can influence behaviour and
transform themselves in ways that do not reflect the intentions of any social actor,
the initial categorisers and ‘securitisers’ included.
However, contrary to what societal security theorists at times imply, being an
independent social variable is not the same as being an independent social agent: the
latter suggests consciousness, purpose and self-control whereas the former does not.
Just as a pilot who loses control over his or her airplane in a thunderstorm does not
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thereby enable the airplane to control itself, so groups and group processes that
spiral beyond the influence of those who once controlled them do not get to ‘control
themselves’; they cannot develop preferences or display agency and they cannot
value or protect ‘their’ societal security.
As do many other approaches in the social sciences, the Copenhagen school often
blurs the distinction between ‘groups as independent social actors’ and ‘groups as
independent social variables’. But this distinction is crucial. The former entails
impermissible reification while the latter builds on the valuable insight that social
formations and processes can move beyond the control of the individuals who
initiated, participate in and are affected by them. And as was shown, this can apply
to the logic of societal security as much as it can apply to any other social process.
To summarise: first, for the Copenhagen school to claim that groups want to
defend their societal security is broadly equivalent to social identity theorists
asserting that individuals want to preserve their internalised group categorisations.
The latter, however, is conceptually much more precise and avoids reifying and
‘substantialist’ language. Moreover, as is shown below, it paves the way for an
understanding of the motivational factors that drive the societal security logic in the
first place. Second, societal security theorists are mistaken in their claim that treating
society as an independent social agent is both essential to the societal security logic
and the only alternative to a reductionistic individualism that dispenses with society
as an analytical concept. Instead, social identity theory allows us to de-reify societies
without thereby theorising them out of existence, to treat them as independent
variables but not as independent agents.
This leads to the second vulnerability of the societal security concept, namely, its
reliance on too vague a definition of ‘identity’. Here, too, social identity theory does
valuable work. As was shown, it takes social identity to pertain to group categories
that have become internalised and thus part of the self. This definition of identity is
close to the term ‘sameness’ which reflects its literal meaning. Following on from
this, social identity theory treats group identity as a process in the same way that the
dialectic of internalisation and externalisation that sustains group representations is
itself ongoing: to ‘have’ a particular identity means continuously to identify with the
identity object and to remain entangled in the process that makes identification
possible. However, as does the societal security model, social identity theory does
not claim that identities are necessarily fickle and transient. Some groups, such as
those in the minimal group experiment, are very ephemeral. But through the process
discussed, many ‘real world’ identity communities come to be so deeply internalised
and inhabit such a large portion of the self that they become very resistant to
change. Though neither groups nor group identities are things, they can acquire a
‘thing-like’ texture. It is this characteristic which enables the societal security logic to
take hold.
Still on the identity issue, social identity theory offers another important insight.
It flows from its insistence on the cognitive importance of group categorisation and
is borne out by the minimal group experiments in which subjects identify with their
groups even though – being ‘minimal’ – they lack any cultural characteristics. This
implies that an individual’s social identity does not derive in the first instance from
the cultural attributes of the community in question (such as, its language, values
and customs). Societal security is not cultural security. Instead, according to social
identity theory, individuals seek to protect group boundaries because group
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categorisations and group differences are intrinsically valuable to them. They do
value particular cultural attributes, but less as ends in themselves than as markers
that sustain the boundaries of their groups. In short, societal security theorists
sometimes imply that individuals want to defend their groups because these groups
contain their culture. Social identity theory, by contrast, suggests that people value
their culture because it helps sustain their groups, with ‘groupness’ serving basic
cognitive and emotional needs.
All this echoes Fredrik Barth’s well-known conclusion that what is important
about groups is their boundaries rather than the cultural stuff they enclose.46 It also
conforms to the observation that groups often change their signifiers while the
boundaries they signify and thus the groups themselves remain intact.47
There is a danger here of sliding into excessive ‘social psychologising’: not
everything people value and want to preserve is valued because it signifies group
boundaries. All the same, if one accepts the central claim of social identity theory that
group identity and by extension societal security is more about group boundaries
than about group ‘content’, an expanded research agenda for societal security
studies comes into view. This agenda brings it into overlap with semiotics and large
parts of contemporary cultural theory. It must focus on how particular cultural
signifiers become ‘attached’ to and ‘detached’ from group boundaries, and thereby
become bound up with processes of securisation and desecurisation respectively. A
given development constitutes an identity threat if it is perceived to threaten
something that signifies group boundaries. But once the thing in question no longer
signifies group boundaries a threat to it no longer threatens these boundaries. For
instance, if being a ‘white country’ ceases to be a defining aspect of ‘who we are’,
then ‘non-white’ immigrants stop threatening ‘our identity’ and stop eliciting societal
security responses. Immigration thus becomes desecuritised.
Among societal security theorists, Ole Wæver in particular has increasingly come
to focus on the potential for desecurisation.48 And in some ways this is a happier
project by comparison, as it helps offset the bleaker ‘tribalist’ implications that stick
to social identity theory and the societal security concept alike, and that trouble
scholars in both traditions.49 If identity pertains more to group boundaries than to
particular group norms, a change of these norms – for instance away from racial
into ‘civic’ directions – becomes more conceivable.
There remains the final problem with the Copenhagen school’s concept of societal
security, namely its failure to account for motivational factors. As was argued, in
places its proponents make the reifying claim that societies seek to protect their
societal security – a view that makes the question of human motivation redundant
to the extent that it does not treat individuals as the central actors. Elsewhere, they
take the sounder view that individuals want societal security, but largely fail to
elaborate on what motivates them. As should have become clearer by now, social
identity theory offers an answer: people defend their group boundaries because
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they have an innate need for ‘groupness’, that is, to maintain self- and other-
categorisations and to protect their groups as sources of positive self-evaluations. In
this way, social identity theory provides a motivational explanation which the
Copenhagen school lacks and renders the concept of societal security sharper and
more plausible.
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